지난 사월, 춘천에 가려고 하다가 못 가고 말았다. 나는 성심(聖心) 여자 대학에 가 보고 싶었다. 그 학교에, 어느 가을 학기, 매주 한 번씩 출강한 일이 있었다. 힘드는 출강을 한 학기 하게 된 것은, 주 수녀님과 김 수녀님이 내 집에 오신 것에 대한 예의도 있었지만, 나에게는 사연이 있었다.
수십 년 전, 내가 열 일곱 되던 봄, 나는 처음 도쿄(東京)에 간 일이 있다. 어떤 분의 소개로 사회 교육가 M 선생 댁에 유숙(留宿)을 하게 되었다. 시바쿠(芝區)에 있는 그 집에는 주인 내외와 어린 딸, 세 식구가 살고 있었다. 하녀도 서생(書生)도 없었다. 눈이 예쁘고 웃는 얼굴을 하는 아사코는 처음부터 나를 오빠같이 따랐다.
아침에 낳았다고 아사코라는 이름을 지어 주었다고 하였다. 그 집 뜰에는 큰 나무들이 있었고, 일년초(一年草) 꽃도 많았다. 내가 간 이튿날 아침, 아사코는 스위이트 피이를 따다가 화병에 담아, 내가 쓰게 된 책상 위에 놓아 주었다. 스위이트 피이는 아사코같이 어리고 귀여운 꽃이라고 생각하였다.
성심 여학원 소학교 일 학년인 아사코는 어느 토요일 오후, 나와 같이 저희 학교에까지 산보를 갔었다. 유치원부터 학부(學部)까지 있는 카톨릭 교육 기관으로 유명한 이 여학원은, 시내에 있으면서 큰 목장까지 가지고 있었다. 아사코는 자기 신장을 열고, 교실에서 신는 하얀 운동화를 보여 주었다.
내가 도쿄를 떠나던 날 아침, 아사코는 내 목을 안고 내 빰에 입을 맞추고, 제가 쓰던 작은 손수건과 제가 끼던 작은 반지를 이별의 선물로 주었다.
그 후, 십 년이 지나고 삼사 년이 더 지났다. 그 동안 나는, 국민 학교 일 학년 같은 예쁜 여자 아이를 보면 아사코 생각을 하였다.
내가 두 번째 도쿄에 갔던 것도 사월이었다. 도쿄역 가까운 데 여관을 정하고 즉시 M 선생 댁을 찾아갔다. 아사코는 어느덧 청순하고 세련되어 보이는 영양(令孃)이 되어 있었다. 그 집 마당에 피어 있는 목련꽃과도 같이. 그 때, 그는 성심 여학원 영문과 3학년이었다. 나는 좀 서먹서먹했으나, 아사코는 나와의 재회를 기뻐하는 것 같았다. 아버지, 어머니가 가끔 내 말을 해서 나의 존재를 기억하고 있었나 보다.
그 날도 토요일이었다. 저녁 먹기 전에 같이 산보를 나갔다. 그리고, 계획하지 않은 발걸음은 성심 여학원 쪽으로 옮겨져 갔다. 캠퍼스를 두루 거닐다가 돌아올 무렵, 나는 아사코 신장은 어디 있느냐고 물어 보았다. 그는 무슨 말인가 하고 나를 쳐다보다가, 교실에는 구두를 벗지 않고 그냥 들어간다고 하였다. 그리고는, 갑자기 뛰어가서 그 날 잊어버리고 교실에 두고 온 우산을 가지고 왔다.
지금도 나는 여자 우산을 볼 때면, 연두색이 고왔던 그 우산을 연상(聯想)한다. ‘셸부르의 우산’이라는 영화를 내가 그렇게 좋아한 것도 아사코의 우산 때문인가 한다. 아사코와 나는 밤 늦게까지 문학 이야기를 하다가 가벼운 악수를 하고 헤어졌다. 새로 출판된 버지니아 울프의 소설 ‘세월’에 대해서도 이야기한 것 같다.
그 후 또 십여 년이 지났다. 그 동안 제 2차 세계 대전이 있었고, 우리 나라가 해방이 되고, 또 한국 전쟁이 있었다. 나는 어쩌다 아사코 생각을 하곤 했다. 결혼은 하였을 것이요, 전쟁통에 어찌 되지나 았았나, 남편이 전사(戰死)하지나 않았나 하고 별별 생각을 다 하였다.
1954년, 처음 미국 가던 길에 나는 도쿄에 들러 M 선생 댁을 찾아갔다. 뜻밖에 그 동네가 고스란히 그대로 남아 있었다. 그리고, M 선생네는 아직도 그 집에 살고 있었다. 선생 내외분은 흥분된 얼굴로 나를 맞이하였다. 그리고, 한국이 독립이 되어서 무엇보다고 잘 됐다고 치하(致賀)하였다.
아사코는 전쟁이 끝난 후, 맥아더 사령부에서 번역 일을 하고 있다가, 거기서 만난 일본인 2세와 결혼을 하고 따로 나서 산다는 것이었다. 아사코가 전쟁 미망인이 되지 않은 것은 다행이었다. 그러나, 2세와 결혼하였다는 것이 마음에 걸렸다. 만나고 싶다고 그랬더니, 어머니가 아사코의 집으로 안내해 주었다.
뽀족 지붕에 뽀족 창문들이 있는 작은 집이었다. 이십여 년 전 내가 아사코에게 준 동화책 겉장에 있는 집도 이런 집이었다.
“아! 이쁜 집! 우리, 이담에 이런 집에서 같이 살아요.”
아사코의 어린 목소리가 지금도 들린다.
십 년쯤 미리 전쟁이 나고 그만큼 일찍 한국이 독립되었더라면, 아사코의 말대로 우리는 같은 집에서 살 수 있게 되었을지도 모른다. 뾰족 창문들이 있는 집이 아니라도. 이런 부질없는 생각이 스치고 지나갔다.
그 집에 들어서자 마주친 것은 백합 같이 시들어 가는 아사코의 얼굴이었다. ‘세월’이란 소설 이야기를 한 지 십 년이 더 지났었다. 그러나, 나는 아직 싱싱하여야 할 젊은 나이다. 남편은 내가 상상한 것과 같이 일본 사람도 아니고 미국 사람도 아닌, 그리고 진주군 장교라는 것을 뽐내는 사나이였다. 아사코와 나는 절을 몇 번씩 하고 악수도 없이 헤어졌다.
그리워하는데도 한 번 만나고는 못 만나게 되기도 하고, 일생을 못 잊으면서도 아니 만나고 살기도 한다. 아사코와 나는 세 번 만났다. 세 번째는 아니 만났어야 좋았을 것이다.
Two weeks after the excursion, I suddenly realized that Komai Jinzaburo, one of the characters in the novel Daibosatsu Pass, who had lost his position as a bannerman in the Edo shogunate and secretly established a shipyard in Boshu(Chiba Prefecture). I thought to myself, “This is exactly where Komai was based in Sunosaki. Yes, I must have gone to Sunosaki in search of Komai, i.e., Oguri Tadamasa. It was in April of this year that I wrote a blog “Rereading the Daibosatsu Pass.”
11世紀初めの著作とされる『源氏物語』に魅せられている。その第1帖「桐壺」に帝が源氏の将来を考え、来朝中の高麗人(高麗 고려 918-943)の人相見に密かに源氏の相をみさせる場面がある。下のスライドは縦書き文庫「與謝野源氏」桐壺の巻後段から引用した。1枚目の最終行に「皇子を外人の旅宿する鴻臚館へおやりに」とある。
書きかけの文章の題名を再び改め、「ギョンホとその母」[仮英訳] Gyungho and his Mother とした(22/12/05)。<無宗教社会>の虚構性について「中説」という形を借りて描きたいのだが、なかなか思うように進まない。堂々巡りしている。12月に入り数ヵ月ぶりに母に会う三日前、母だけの伝記を書くことを断念し、題名を変更した。畢竟、自分の生き方が母のそれに重なっている、と気づいた。母に会って構想を説明すると、神妙な表情で聞いていた。
There is no such thing as a non-religious society anywhere, but after the summer of 1945, the people inhabiting the island of Japan seemed to think that their society had been reborn as a scientific and non-mythical society. This is not to say that the previous society was unscientific, violent, or fanatical, but August of that year created a historical rupture, and a religious ‘field’ of “100 million repentance” permeated the population. The people did not do this on their own initiative. They had long worshipped the Emperor as a living god and had lost the ability to think under a sophisticated surveillance system, so this time, too, someone had cleverly orchestrated it. The emperor could have remained a god and hidden in the heavenly realm, but instead, he decided to make the succession of the original title of the emperor a bizarre measure by demoting a god to the human realm. This caused a great deal of confusion and bewilderment among the people. One of the mental aftereffects of this was the mass development of what I call the “irreligious” syndrome. Most people with this mental disorder have no subjective symptoms. [Translated with http://www.DeepL.com/Translator%5D
From the latter half of the nineteenth century, under the name of “Wealth and National Strength,” the Japanese Empire went to war with countries that are roughly equivalent to today’s China and Russia, colonizing what is now Taiwan, Korea, and North Korea, and expanding its territory by establishing Manchukuo in the northeastern region of China. In the 1930s, it expanded its war areas into inland China and Southeast Asia, and in the 1940s, it went to war with the United States. In the process, soldiers from both sides killed each other, and the Imperial Japanese Army deprived the people of these regions of their customs and culture, violated their human rights, and slaughtered them.
On the other hand, the Imperial Japanese Army advocated “harmony among the five races” and claimed the liberation of Asia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and its propaganda are reminiscent of the invasion by the Empire of Japan and its control of the press. Although Japan surrendered unconditionally in August 1945 and the Empire of Japan seemed to have collapsed, I believe that the remnants of the Imperial Japanese Empire still exist in some parts of Japanese society.
After the war, new religions sprang up like bamboo shoots after the rain. Many of them were non-religious as well, as a reaction against the false religions of the prewar period, but people blindly followed them without being able to distinguish between religion and non-religion, or decided to have no religion. In such an era, the Soka Gakkai spread its proselytizing activities, known as shakubuku, throughout the country. Its Buddhist movement kicked out existing Buddhist sects, Shintoism, Christianity, and other religions as paganism and pagan religions. People called the Soka Gakkai “Gakkai” for short and abhorred its members, calling them Gakkai members, but few people understood the true nature of the movement. People who were surprised and perplexed by the mass movement called the Gakkai an abominable organization and scorned and ostracized it, calling it “a group of poor and sick people.” Fearing the momentum of this group, some people even described it as totalitarianism based only on the superficial observations of its well-organized members.
In 2023, the view of “religion” of many people in Japanese society had hardly changed from the late 20th century. Rather, irreligiousness has deepened further, and smartphone addiction and its extension, brain-exposure disorder, are widespread.
In postwar Japanese society, where “irreligion” is considered acceptable and normal, perhaps as a reaction against the emperor-centered state Shinto of the prewar era, praying at shrines is considered different from “faith,” and everyone pays homage to shrines on New Year’s Day. In addition, at funerals and Buddhist memorial services, people are asked to recite sutras and chant the Buddhist prayer to the dead, which is considered a mourning and rite of passage for the deceased. As in the prewar period, these are treated as something different from “faith.” The author calls contemporary Japanese society a “non-religious society” as a hypothesis. This work is also based on that hypothesis.
In a “non-religious society,” those who “believe” in something are considered unscientific, and those who have “faith” are marginalized as weak. Those who preach “faith” and invite people to join religious organizations are regarded as shady. People who have been under the control of ideas and information for a long time and who do not have the habit of thinking have lost the ability to think for themselves, as they always had been. This situation has not changed much in the 80 years since the end of World War II. The Gakkai appeared in the vacuum of people’s thoughts and beliefs as described above.
Becoming a Gakkai member is not only a declaration of one’s “faith.” It is a denial of the existing gods and Buddha that people have taken in as a matter of custom. Knowing this, Gyungho’s mother became a Gakkai member. She made the choice to become a Gakkai member even though people around her belittled her, talked about her behind her back, and her husband disliked her. Why, I wonder, did she choose to become a member of the Buddhist movement? Through this essay, I would like to think about it.
Oh, brother . I weep for you. Do not die, little brother. You are the youngest, so your parents’ love must have been strong. Did your parents teach you to hold a knife and kill people? Did they raise you until you were 24 years old, telling you to kill people and die yourself?
You are the owner of a historic merchant family in the city of Sakai. You carry on your parents’ name, so don’t die. I don’t care if the castle in Lushun falls or not. You probably don’t know this, but the merchant’s family code states There is no such item as killing a man and dying yourself.
Do not die, my brother. The Emperor did not go off to war himself. He wants us to shed blood for each other and die in the way of the beast. How can you call that honoring act? Would the deep-hearted Εmperor even think such a thing in the first place?
Oh, my brother. Please don’t die in a war. Your father passed away last fall and Your mother has been painfully in her grief. Her son was drafted and she protects the house by herself. Even though this is supposed to be the era of the Emperor’s reign, which was said to be a time of peace and security. Your mother’s gray hairs are growing.
The frail, young new wife who lies down behind the curtain and weeps. Have you forgotten her? Or do you think of her? Think of the heart of the young wife who left you after less than 10 months of living with you. You are not alone in this world. Oh, who can I turn to again? Please, brother, do not die.
Possible Outcomes of the Russo-Ukrainian War and China’s Choice
US-China Perception Monitor
3 days ago
Update on March 13, 2022: The following article was submitted by the author to the Chinese-language edition of the US-China Perception Monitor. The article was not commissioned by the US-China Perception Monitor, nor is the author affiliated with the Carter Center or the US-China Perception Monitor.
Hu Wei is the vice-chairman of the Public Policy Research Center of the Counselor’s Office of the State Council, the chairman of Shanghai Public Policy Research Association, the chairman of the Academic Committee of the Chahar Institute, a professor, and a doctoral supervisor. To read more by Hu, click here to read his article on “How did Deng Xiaoping coordinate domestic and international affairs?”
Written on March 5, 2022. Translated by Jiaqi Liu on March 12, 2022.
English
中文
English
The Russo-Ukrainian War is the most severe geopolitical conflict since World War II and will result in far greater global consequences than September 11 attacks. At this critical moment, China needs to accurately analyze and assess the direction of the war and its potential impact on the international landscape. At the same time, in order to strive for a relatively favorable external environment, China needs to respond flexibly and make strategic choices that conform to its long-term interests.Russia’s ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine has caused great controvsery in China, with its supporters and opponents being divided into two implacably opposing sides. This article does not represent any party and, for the judgment and reference of the highest decision-making level in China, this article conducts an objective analysis on the possible war consequences along with their corresponding countermeasure options.
I. Predicting the Future of the Russo-Ukrainian War 1. Vladimir Putin may be unable to achieve his expected goals, which puts Russia in a tight spot. The purpose of Putin’s attack was to completely solve the Ukrainian problem and divert attention from Russia’s domestic crisis by defeating Ukraine with a blitzkrieg, replacing its leadership, and cultivating a pro-Russian government. However, the blitzkrieg failed, and Russia is unable to support a protracted war and its associated high costs. Launching a nuclear war would put Russia on the opposite side of the whole world and is therefore unwinnable. The situations both at home and abroad are also increasingly unfavorable. Even if the Russian army were to occupy Ukraine’s capital Kyiv and set up a puppet government at a high cost, this would not mean final victory. At this point, Putin’s best option is to end the war decently through peace talks, which requires Ukraine to make substantial concessions. However, what is not attainable on the battlefield is also difficult to obtain at the negotiating table. In any case, this military action constitutes an irreversible mistake. 2. The conflict may escalate further, and the West’s eventual involvement in the war cannot be ruled out. While the escalation of the war would be costly, there is a high probability that Putin will not give up easily given his character and power. The Russo-Ukrainian war may escalate beyond the scope and region of Ukraine, and may even include the possibility of a nuclear strike. Once this happens, the U.S. and Europe cannot stay aloof from the conflict, thus triggering a world war or even a nuclear war. The result would be a catastrophe for humanity and a showdown between the United States and Russia. This final confrontation, given that Russia’s military power is no match for NATO’s, would be even worse for Putin. 3. Even if Russia manages to seize Ukraine in a desperate gamble, it is still a political hot potato. Russia would thereafter carry a heavy burden and become overwhelmed. Under such circumstances, no matter whether Volodymyr Zelensky is alive or not, Ukraine will most likely set up a government-in-exile to confront Russia in the long term. Russia will be subject both to Western sanctions and rebellion within the territory of Ukraine. The battle lines will be drawn very long. The domestic economy will be unsustainable and will eventually be dragged down. This period will not exceed a few years.4. The political situation in Russia may change or be disintegrated at the hands of the West. After Putin’s blitzkrieg failed, the hope of Russia’s victory is slim and Western sanctions have reached an unprecedented degree. As people’s livelihoods are severely affected and as anti-war and anti-Putin forces gather, the possibility of a political mutiny in Russia cannot be ruled out. With Russia’s economy on the verge of collapse, it would be difficult for Putin to prop up the perilous situation even without the loss of the Russo-Ukrainian war. If Putin were to be ousted from power due to civil strife, coup d’état, or another reason, Russia would be even less likely to confront the West. It would surely succumb to the West, or even be further dismembered, and Russia’s status as a great power would come to an end.
II. Analysis of the Impact of Russo-Ukrainian war On International Landscape 1. The United States would regain leadership in the Western world, and the West would become more united. At present, public opinion believes that the Ukrainian war signifies a complete collapse of U.S. hegemony, but the war would in fact bring France and Germany, both of which wanted to break away from the U.S., back into the NATO defense framework, destroying Europe’s dream to achieve independent diplomacy and self-defense. Germany would greatly increase its military budget; Switzerland, Sweden, and other countries would abandon their neutrality. With Nord Stream 2 put on hold indefinitely, Europe’s reliance on US natural gas will inevitably increase. The US and Europe would form a closer community of shared future, and American leadership in the Western world will rebound. 2. The “Iron Curtain” would fall again not only from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, but also to the final confrontation between the Western-dominated camp and its competitors. The West will draw the line between democracies and authoritarian states, defining the divide with Russia as a struggle between democracy and dictatorship. The new Iron Curtain will no longer be drawn between the two camps of socialism and capitalism, nor will it be confined to the Cold War. It will be a life-and-death battle between those for and against Western democracy. The unity of the Western world under the Iron Curtain will have a siphon effect on other countries: the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy will be consolidated, and other countries like Japan will stick even closer to the U.S., which will form an unprecedentedly broad democratic united front. 3. The power of the West will grow significantly, NATO will continue to expand, and U.S. influence in the non-Western world will increase. After the Russo-Ukrainian War, no matter how Russia achieves its political transformation, it will greatly weaken the anti-Western forces in the world. The scene after the 1991 Soviet and Eastern upheavals may repeat itself: theories on “the end of ideology” may reappear, the resurgence of the third wave of democratization will lose momentum, and more third world countries will embrace the West. The West will possess more “hegemony” both in terms of military power and in terms of values and institutions, its hard power and soft power will reach new heights. 4. China will become more isolated under the established framework. For the above reasons, if China does not take proactive measures to respond, it will encounter further containment from the US and the West. Once Putin falls, the U.S. will no longer face two strategic competitors but only have to lock China in strategic containment. Europe will further cut itself off from China; Japan will become the anti-China vanguard; South Korea will further fall to the U.S.; Taiwan will join the anti-China chorus, and the rest of the world will have to choose sides under herd mentality. China will not only be militarily encircled by the U.S., NATO, the QUAD, and AUKUS, but also be challenged by Western values and systems.
III. China’s Strategic Choice 1. China cannot be tied to Putin and needs to be cut off as soon as possible. In the sense that an escalation of conflict between Russia and the West helps divert U.S. attention from China, China should rejoice with and even support Putin, but only if Russia does not fall. Being in the same boat with Putin will impact China should he lose power. Unless Putin can secure victory with China’s backing, a prospect which looks bleak at the moment, China does not have the clout to back Russia. The law of international politics says that there are “no eternal allies nor perpetual enemies,” but “our interests are eternal and perpetual.” Under current international circumstances, China can only proceed by safeguarding its own best interests, choosing the lesser of two evils, and unloading the burden of Russia as soon as possible. At present, it is estimated that there is still a window period of one or two weeks before China loses its wiggle room. China must act decisively. 2. China should avoid playing both sides in the same boat, give up being neutral, and choose the mainstream position in the world. At present, China has tried not to offend either side and walked a middle ground in its international statements and choices, including abstaining from the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly votes. However, this position does not meet Russia’s needs, and it has infuriated Ukraine and its supporters as well as sympathizers, putting China on the wrong side of much of the world. In some cases, apparent neutrality is a sensible choice, but it does not apply to this war, where China has nothing to gain. Given that China has always advocated respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it can avoid further isolation only by standing with the majority of the countries in the world. This position is also conducive to the settlement of the Taiwan issue. 3. China should achieve the greatest possible strategic breakthrough and not be further isolated by the West. Cutting off from Putin and giving up neutrality will help build China’s international image and ease its relations with the U.S. and the West. Though difficult and requiring great wisdom, it is the best option for the future. The view that a geopolitical tussle in Europe triggered by the war in Ukraine will significantly delay the U.S. strategic shift from Europe to the Indo-Pacific region cannot be treated with excessive optimism. There are already voices in the U.S. that Europe is important, but China is more so, and the primary goal of the U.S. is to contain China from becoming the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region. Under such circumstances, China’s top priority is to make appropriate strategic adjustments accordingly, to change the hostile American attitudes towards China, and to save itself from isolation. The bottom line is to prevent the U.S. and the West from imposing joint sanctions on China. 4. China should prevent the outbreak of world wars and nuclear wars and make irreplaceable contributions to world peace. As Putin has explicitly requested Russia’s strategic deterrent forces to enter a state of special combat readiness, the Russo-Ukrainian war may spiral out of control. A just cause attracts much support; an unjust one finds little. If Russia instigates a world war or even a nuclear war, it will surely risk the world’s turmoil. To demonstrate China’s role as a responsible major power, China not only cannot stand with Putin, but also should take concrete actions to prevent Putin’s possible adventures. China is the only country in the world with this capability, and it must give full play to this unique advantage. Putin’s departure from China’s support will most likely end the war, or at least not dare to escalate the war. As a result, China will surely win widespread international praise for maintaining world peace, which may help China prevent isolation but also find an opportunity to improve its relations with the United States and the West.
a. ①事務上の記載間違い、または②本人意思によらない他人の勝手な書換え手続きで「韓国」となったもののみ例外的に記載変更を認めた。 b. ①韓国の在外国民登録をしていない、②韓国旅券の発給を受けたことがない、③協定永住許可がなされていないの三点を確認できれば市町村長限りで「朝鮮」への記載変更を認めた。 c. 本人陳述のみ
国家とは何か。憲法が国を作るのであって国が憲法を作るのではない(近代法の常識)。明治憲法の作った国を大日本帝国といい、日本国憲法の作った国を日本国という。二つは根本的に違う国であるから、当然にその原理を異にする。明治国家の統治原理を「法治国家 Rechtsstaat」といい、日本国の統治原理を「法の支配 rule of law」という。前者は立憲君主制の統治原理であり、主権が天皇にある以上、基本的人権という概念は認められない。個人は具体的な法律が認めた限りで権利を認められたにすぎない(法律の留保)。
I may continue to write this “chusetsu” which literally means middle statement or opinion, not “shosetsu,”a novel, until the day I die. Since I began writing at the age of seventy-two, it will probably be another ten or twenty years at most, but it is also the most fulfilling time of my life. I don’t call it the last years of my life, because the concept of which is captured by the way of the traditional time frame. People living in “irreligious societies” are usually unaware of their “irreligiousness.” It infiltrates their lives like air, and they are unaware of it, but there are people who become aware of their “irreligiousness” suddenly one day. Once they become aware of it, they never forget it. Rather, it persistently follows them, and they have to live their lives struggling against it. Because of this conflict, the way they relate to society becomes unnatural, causing friction with those around them, and they are often inconvenienced in some way. Many people attempt suicide because they cannot stand the hassle. Through Gyungho, his mother, Gyungho’s cohabitant Miyeon, and others, I tried to depict how they live in a “irreligious society” and what they have in common. I began writing this text last November under the title “Notes on the creation of an experimental novel: Converts of the Haijin-kyo.” As the word “experimental” suggests, I had my doubts about it being a novel. Later, I decided that this was not a novel and decided to call it a critical novel (a text that falls somewhere between a novel and a critical essay). I also revised the title to “Converts of the Haijin-kyo” and “Pseudo-believers of the Haijin-kyo,” and further changed it to “Living in an irreligious society.” I am still writing the book. It is still being written. I will maintain the “experimental” nature of the book, in the sense that it is created by direct input to the Tategaki-bunko (vertical writing library) website, and the style of sharing the writing process with readers will remain the same. I believe that there can be “chusetsu” which literally means middle theory, or “critical novels,” that critique society and people’s way of life fundamentally. The question is whether readers will recognize and accept such works, but as an author, I have no choice but to continue writing. (translated by DeepL)
제27조(실종의 선고) ① 부재자의 생사가 5년간 분명하지 아니한 때에는 법원은 이해관계인이나 검사의 청구에 의하여 실종선고를 하여야 한다. ② 전지에 임한 자, 침몰한 선박 중에 있던 자, 추락한 항공기 중에 있던 자 기타 사망의 원인이 될 위난을 당한 자의 생사가 전쟁종지후 또는 선박의 침몰, 항공기의 추락 기타 위난이 종료한 후 1년간 분명하지 아니한 때에도 제1항과 같다. <개정 1984.4.10>
제28조 (실종선고의 효과) 실종선고를 받은 자는 전조의 기간이 만료한 때에 사망한 것으로 본다.
제29조(실종선고의 취소) ①실종자의 생존한 사실 또는 전조의 규정과 상이한 때에 사망한 사실의 증명이 있으면 법원은 본인, 이해관계인 또는 검사의 청구에 의하여 실종선고를 취소하여야 한다. 그러나 실종선고후 그 취소전에 선의로 한 행위의 효력에 영향을 미치지 아니한다. ②실종선고의 취소가 있을 때에 실종의 선고를 직접원인으로 하여 재산을 취득한 자가 선의인 경우에는 그 받은 이익이 현존하는 한도에서 반환할 의무가 있고 악의인 경우에는 그 받은 이익에 이자를 붙여서 반환하고 손해가 있으면 이를 배상하여야 한다.
제27조(실종의 선고) ①부재자의 생사가5년간 분명하지 아니한 때에는 법원은 이해관계인이나 검사의 청구에 의하여 실종선고를 하여야 한다. ②전지에 임한 자, 침몰한 선박 중에 있던 자, 추락한 항공기 중에 있던 자 기타 사망의 원인이 될 위난을 당한 자의 생사가 전쟁종지후 또는 선박의 침몰, 항공기의 추락 기타 위난이 종료한 후1년간 분명하지 아니한 때에도 제1항과 같다. <개정 1984. 4. 10.>
“One thing that struck me in my study of history is how people are excluded. I don’t mean just racial minorities or women. Pretty much all poor people who don’t have documents are excluded from history and its records. People who were illiterate usually didn’t leave any primary documents. I was interested in how we think about people because the history that we have is limited to an elite body. In my experience of trying to interview people from all different backgrounds, especially the very, very poor and the illiterate, I notice that their attitude is, ‘We know that we weren’t included in the party. However, we are fine. We’re still going to keep on going. It doesn’t matter. We’re just going to adapt.’ That is the primary idea of this book. History has failed pretty much everybody. And yet no matter, we persist.”
Exploring Korea’s painful past
“In the 21st century and in the latter part of the 20th century, we think of South Korea and North Korea. But for 5,000 years, there was just Korea. When it was just Korea, it essentially became a colony of Japan. Japan, which is a wonderful country, has very few natural resources. So when Japan wanted to expand, Korea became its breadbasket. They took a lot of things from Korea and the experience of most Koreans of that era is one of general humiliation because they had their property, language and a lot of their authority taken away. The experience of the people who lived under the occupation was very difficult because they lost their national identity. A lot of people don’t like to talk about it. It’s a period of history that’s very complicated for the modern Korean to tackle because it’s one of humiliation.”
Expanding Western education
“We have huge holes in our education in the West. I think that we have little knowledge of Asian history. If you ask a well-educated, modern Western person about World War II, most will think that the theatre of war was only in Europe. But it’s known that the Pacific War was going on concurrently, and we don’t know anything about it. The 20th century Cold War proxy wars all took place in Asia. Yet again, we know hardly anything about it. This is a failure of the educational system. But people decide what is worth studying. We are going to have to know much more about Asia and the Middle East than we want to, or think that we need to know in the West.”
Recognizing the Korean Japanese experience
“If I force myself to wonder what made me think about and work on this book for almost 30 years, it’s this sense that the Korean-Japanese experience was never my experience. I moved to Queens, New York when I was seven and a half. I went to middle school in a foreign country, but I had so many different kinds of Americans push me along and encourage me. I was very odd. I didn’t talk very well, we were poor and we didn’t have any connections, but people showed up and pushed me along. I knew that there was something wrong if a country not only rejected you, but also your parents and your grandparents. This is what happened to the Korean-Japanese. Even today, they’re not considered citizens.”
Min Jin Lee’s comments have been edited and condensed.
Music to close the broadcast program: “Arirang,” performed by Wu Man, Luis Conte and Daniel Ho.
UNQUOTE
Min Jin Lee は1968年に韓国で生まれ、7歳のとき家族とともに米国に移住し、ニューヨーク市に住むことになった。2nd grade に入学するが、授業も同級生の会話も聞き取れず、つらい孤独な時期を過ごしたようだ。https://www.minjinlee.com/
父親は北朝鮮の出身で、朝鮮戦争の戦禍を逃れてプサンにたどり着き、戦後は米軍関係の仕事に就いたらしい。そのころプサン出身の母親と出会い、周囲の反対を押し切って結婚したという。母親の周辺に教会関係者がいたようだ。Min Jin Lee の略歴にふれたのは、小説 Pachinko が描く在日コリアン像に著者の在米コリアンとしての来歴が重なって見えるからだ。